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POST-INCORPORATION S U B S C R I P T I0 N S AND
OTHER CONTRACTS TO CREATE* SHARES
AT A FUTURE TIME
ALEXANDER HAMILTON FpEY
The general subject of "subscriptions" to corporate shares
has received little or no adequate analysis either by courts or
text writers in this country. The term "subscription" (or "sub-
scription contract" or "subscription agreement") is employed by
both courts and commentators in a variety of senses of which
the following are the more frequent examples:
I. Agreements between a number of persons contemplating
the future formation of a corporation, each one of whom desig-
nates the number of shares in the proposed corporation which he
will take upon its organization.
2. Agreements between promoters of corporations and an
individual whereby the individual promises the promoters to be-
come the holder of a designated number of shares in a corpora-
tion to be formed by them. Here the contract differs from that
set out in class one, in that the agreement is not between those
who contemplate shareholdership in the corporation to be organ-
ized, but between one such person and the promoters.
*Shares are units of existing legal relations. When new shares come into
existence new units of the totality of legal relations constituting corporate
"membership" are created. A corporation is never in any useful sense a share-
holder with respect to its own shares. The term "issue" when applied to shares
imports a transfer from the corporation to someone of something already in
existence. This implication of the term has resulted in much confusion of
thought, especially with respect to so-called "treasury shares." Consequently,
throughout this paper, the present writer will employ the word "create" rather
than "issue" with reference to transactions purporting to result in a change in
the number or character of shares outstanding, and the term "issue" will be
used only in connection with "shares certificates," the tangible evidence of"shares." The practitioner frequently uses the expression "create shares" to
describe an increase in the corporation's authorized capital stock, but until fur-
ther acts occur this merely results in the corporation having additional tower to
create ("issue") shares, and this capacity of the corporation obviously ought to
be distinguished sharply from the aggregate of rights, duties, etc., which con-
stitutes one the holder of a share.
(750)
CONTRACTS TO CREATE SHARES
3. Transactions between an existing corporation and an in-
dividual whereby shares of that corporation of a designated class
and number are immediately created as to such individual, espe-
cially if the duty to deliver a share certificate to the other party'
is contingent upon certain agreed payments being made by him.
4. Contracts between a corporation and an individual for
the creation at a future date of shares of the corporation of a des--
ignated class .and number as to the individual. Here, as in the-
case of pre-incorporation subscriptions, the transaction may be
merely between one individual and the corporation or it may in-
volve a number of individuals and the corporation, as where a.
so-called subscription list is circulated and signed by those desir-
ing to have shares or additional shares created as to them at a
future date.
"Since it would be inipossible within the compass of a single
paper to deal adequately with all four of these types of "sub-
scriptions," this article will be limited to contracts between an
existing corporation and a person for the creation of shares in
the future. This includes the fourth type of "subscriptions"
enumerated above as well as other transactions not usually la-
belled "subscriptions" but involving the creation of shares in the,
future, such as convertible securities, stock purchase warrants
and so-called pledges of unissued shares. All forms of pre-incor-
poration subscription agreements, however, and all transactions
between an existing corporation and a person contemplating the
creation of shares immediately at the time of the transaction are
expressly excluded from the scope 'of this paper. But before pro-
ceeding along the narrow path selected, a brief explanation would
seem desirable of the difficulty of determining whether a given
transaction resulted in shareholdership being at once created as
to a particular person, or constituted only a contract to create such
shares in the future.
'Throughout this paper "the other party" refers to the person dealing with
the corporation for the creation of shares as to him, whether he be a "sub-
scriber," convertible security holder, "pledgee of unissued shares," holder of a
stock purchase warrant, etc.
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How ARE SHARES CREATED?
Although there is still a widespread tendency in practice to
confuse share certificates with the shares they evidence, it is today
generally conceded that the issuance of a share certificate is not
essential to the creation of shares. 2 Moreover, the authorities
agree that even payment is not a pre-requisite to the creation of
shares.3 What, then, are the acts which must occur in order that
new shares may come into existence? Assuming that a corpora-
tion has power to create shares of a given class and number (i. e.,
that such shares are part of the authorized but unissued capital
stock), if a transaction occurs between the corporation and a per-
son whereby the corporation and the person mutually manifest
consent to the immediate creation of such shares as to such per-
son, he becomes at once the holder of the shares, provided the
creation of such shares as to such person or upon the agreed terms
is not rendered impossible by some controlling law. For example,
although the contemplated shares might be part of the corpora-
tion's authorized but unissued capital stock, the transaction might
contravene a rule of law not merely forbidding but making im-
possible the creation of shares as to an enemy alien, or prior to
the actual receipt by the corporation of the full par value thereof.
But if no such special obstacle frustrates the desire of the parties,
the common law would appear to require, for the immediate crea-
tion of shares which the corporation is then empowered to cre-
ate, nothing more than the aforesaid mutual manifestations of
consent thereto.
4
Perhaps it will be objected that the situation posited is highly
academic in that normally such a transaction either would be
accompanied by the issuance to the other party of a share certifi-
25 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 3512; I CooK, CORPOPLATIONS
(8th ed. 1923) § 8o; I MAcHEN,CORPORATIONS (1908) § 171.
3 5 THOMPSON, loc. cit. supra note 2; I CoOK, loc. cit. supra note 2; x
MACHEN, op. Cit. supra note 2, § 174.
'Cf. I MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 173, saying: "According to this
(most American courts') view of the common law, all that is necessary to con-
stitute a person a shareholder is a present intention on his part and on the part
of the company that the relation of shareholder and corporation subsist between
them. When once that intention exists, the relationship is eodem instanti estab-
lished without the necessity of any formality whatsoever."
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cate or would clearly indicate the mutual intention that the other
party was not to become the holder of the shares in question until
a future date upon which a share certificate or an equivalent in-
strument would be tendered or at least made available to him.
Unfortunately, such a simple presentation of the situation fails
to reveal two major difficulties inherent -in many of the cases
involving transactions for the creation of shares. In the first
place, it assumes (as I have thus far appeared to do) that share-
holdership is a definite status and that therefore the other party
at a specified time either is or is not the holder of the designated
shares, whereas an examination of the cases justifies only a very
limited assent to such a view; 5 and in the second place, it assumes
not only that the parties had a definite and reciprocal under-
' The difficulty of categorically determining shareholdership is well illus-
trated by cases in a single jurisdiction arising out of transactions in violation of
a constitutional provision that "no corporation shall issue stock except for money
paid, labor done, or-property actually received, and all fictitious increase of stock
or indebtedness shall be void." For example, in Texas, where art. 12, § 6 of the
constitution so provides, if corporation C issues to S certificates for common
shares and S pays the corporation nothing in return therefor, or merely gives
his note, and the certificates state they are full-paid and non-assessable (or at
least fail to state that they are not full-paid) does S become a shareholder? S
is responsible to creditors of corporation C for his proportion of unsecured
debts up to the par value of his shares. Rowan v. Texas Orchard Development
Co., i8i S. W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); McWhirter v. First State Bank of
Amarillo, 182 S. W. 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). Corporation C can maintain
an action against S (or even an innocent transferee) for surrender and cancel-
lation of the certificates. Walker Cadwell Producing Co. v. Menefee, 24o
S. W. IO23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). S can maintain an action for recovery and
cancellation of a note and a deed in trust securing the note given to the corpora-
tion in return for the certificates. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Pearson,
i88 S. W. 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), rev'd, 222 S. W. 967 (Tex. Comm. App.
192o) (on the ground that the constitution had not been violated). Is S a share-
holder?
In California under a similar constitutional provision (art. XII, § ii)
would S become a shareholder as a result of such a transaction? S is respon-
sible to creditors of corporation C for the difference between the amount paid
and par, but not exceeding the amount of the creditors' claims. Herron Co. v.
Shaw, i65 Cal. 668, 133 Pac. 488 (913). Innocent donee transferees of S are
not responsible to C's creditors for the amount unpaid on such shares. Rhode v.
Dock-Hop Co., 184 Cal. 367, 194 Pac. ii (1920). Shareholders of corporation
C can maintain a representative suit against S for surrender and cancellation of
the certificates. James v. Steifer Mining Co., 35 Cal. App. 778, 171 Pac. 117
(i918); cf. Domenigoni v. Imperial Live Stock & Mortgage Co., i89 Cal. 467,
2o9 Pac. 36 (1922) (in which S, to whom certificates had been issued for notes
instead of for the percentage of cash required by the Blue Sky Commission, was
held not entitled to a recovery and cancellation of the notes).
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standing of the legal relations implied by their use of the term
"shares" in their transaction, but also that the intent of the par-
ties as to the time when these legal relations are to come into ex-
istence is clearly evidenced.
WHEN ARE SHARES CREATED?
A study, of the "nature" of a share is beyond the purport of
this paper, but inasmuch as I find it convenient to use the term
herein and deplore the vague sense in which it is usually employed,
possibly I shall be excused for emphasizing that the term "share"
is but a symbol for an aggregate of legal relations. If this be
agreed, obviously the term has little or no utility unless the legal
relations which it connotes are mutually understood. A specific
person may, moreover, have some, but not necessarily all, of these
legal relations with a corporation," and the conception of "share-
holdership" as a status becomes comprehensible only if the legal
relations normally embraced by that term are enumerated. I
therefore venture to indicate the principal legal relations which I
find it convenient to describe, perhaps arbitrarily, by my concep-
tion of the norm of a "corporate share": (i) right to vote; (2)
right to participate in "net earnings" or "surplus"; (3) right to
participate in "capital distributions"; (4) right to examine the
corporate books; (5) right to maintain a representative suit; (6)
duty to pay "calls" or "assessments"; (7) responsibility to cor-
porate creditors to the extent of "capital contributions": (8) fur-
ther responsibility to corporate creditors where imposed by stat-
ute. Of course these legal incidents will vary with the particular
class of shares concerned; and therefore the present emphasis is
not upon the specific incidents but upon recognition that "share"
is not a unified relationship but a complex concept implying a
number of separable legal relations.
Assuming a general understanding of the precise legal inci-
dents attaching to shares of a given class, our initial problem is
to determine when that totality of legal relations, and in that
'Cf. Comment, Effects of Irregular Attempts to Create Corporate Shares
(1927) 37 YALE L. J. 362.
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sense "shareholdership," has resulted from a particular transac-
tion. In other words, what acts of the corporation and of the
other party shall we interpret as constituting manifestations of
consent to the present creation of shares of a designated class and
number, and what acts shall we construe as contemplating the
future creation of such shares, that is, as forming contracts to
create shares at a future time? Normally, the tender by the cor-
poration of a share certificate and the acceptance of it by the other
party would be unequivocal manifestations of consent to the im-
mediate creation of such shares as to such person, and, if the
shares described in the certificate were part of the corporation's
authorized but unissued capital stock, "shareholdership" would
usually result. Obviously, however, this ought not to be the sole
test, for if a corporation, regretting its bargain, refuses a share
certificate for the immediate delivery of which it has accepted
payment, this ought not to postpone the rights of the other party
as a shareholder until such time as he could obtain appropriate
judicial relief, especially if he cannot readily acquire similar
shares on the market.
In a carefully drafted written contract the intention of the
parties as to the time when the other party is to become a share-
holder will be clearly indicated.7 But not infrequently such trans-
actions are exceedingly vagne as to this time element," although
it may be of considerable importance to the other party whether
he is to participate in the benefits and burdens of the corporate
enterprise at once' or not until some later date. Consider, for
example, some typical cases. Corporation C presents to S and
he signs the following instrument:
"Examples: In the subscription receipts for common stock issued by the
Mohawk Hudson Power Corporation it is specifically provided: "For the pur-
pose of voting and of receiving dividends, and for such purposes only, the regis-
tered holder hereof shall be deemed a registered holder of one share of the com-
mon stock of the Company for each $20.00 which shall have been actually paid
to the Company hereunder at the time and in the manner herein provided for."
Subscription warrants recently issued by the Detroit Edison Company ex-
pressly state: "To those making payments of the subscription in instalments,
transferable purchase certificates, acknowledging receipt of the first instalment
payment, will be issued. . . . The purchase certificates shall not entitle the
holders thereof to voting or any other rights of a stockholder."
'See examples infra p. 756.
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"I hereby subscribe for fifty shares of the common
stock of corporation C of the par value of $ioo.oo each, for
which I agree to pay $iooo.oo upon the signing of this sub-
scription and $4ooo.oo in such manner and at such times
as the board of directors of the corporation may direct." '
Upon payment of the $iooo.oo does S become at once a share-
holder, or is this a contract for the future creation as to S of fifty
shares upon payment of the last "call" of the board? Or cor-
poration C presents to S and he signs the following instrument:
"I hereby subscribe for fifty shares of the common stock
of corporation C of the par value of $ioo.oo each, provided
subscriptions totalling $5o,ooo are obtained." 10
Assuming that corporation C is then in existence and that this is
not a pre-incorporation subscription, does S automatically be-
come a shareholder upon the fulfillment of the condition by C
obtaining bona fide subscriptions totalling $50,000, or does S
become a shareholder only at such future time as C may unequi-
vocally recognize him as a shareholder either by tendering him
a certificate or by entering his name upon the register of share-
holders, etc.? Again, corporation C presents to S and he signs
the following instrument:
"I hereby purchase fifty shares of the common stock
of corporation C at $ioo.oo per share. It is understood and
agreed that the certificate will be issued as soon as available
provided the purchase price as aforementioned has been paid
in full." 11
Does S become a shareholder immediately upon signing the instru-
ment, or upon payment in full, or not until the corporation there-
after has done some act such as tendering him a share certificate
whereby it then manifests its consent to his becoming the holder
of the shares in question?
'Cf. In re Hall, 206 Fed. 85o (N. D. Iowa 1913).
" Cf. St. Paul, etc., R. R. v. Robbins, 23 Minn. 439 (1877).
'Cf. Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4 N. J. Misc. 3io, 132 Atl. 494
(1926).
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GUIDES TO THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A TRANSACTION
IS AN IMMEDIATE CREATION OF SHARES OR A
CONTRACT FOR THEIR FUTURE CREATION
Whether the acts of the parties in a given transaction should
be interpreted as manifestations of consent to the immediate cre-
ation of shares or not will depend primarily upon the particular
circumstances in each case. A few rules may, however, be sug-
gested as tentative guides to the intention of the parties, but in
no sense as absolute indications. If the agreement includes a
promise by the corporation to permit the other party to partici-
pate in dividend payments from the time the agreement was en-
tered into, this is strong evidence that the transaction was
intended as an immediate creation of shares. 12 Similarly, if the
corporation with the consent of the other party represents to third
persons that payments made by the other party prior to the de-
livery of a share certificate to him are accretions to "capital," this
suggests that the other party was regarded as at once becoming
a shareholder at the time the transaction was entered into.'3 On
the other hand, if the corporation undertakes to pay interest to
the other party on payments made by him prior to the delivery
of a share certificate, this indicates an intention that the other
party is not at once to be regarded as the holder of the shares.14
If the agreement provides for forfeiture of advance payments as
the exclusive remedy of the corporation in the event of the other
party's failure to pay a stipulated instalment when due, this also
'2 When the North American Company offered to its shareholders of record
on August 7, 1924, the opportunity to acquire additional preferred shares, the
subscription agreements provided in part as follows: $2o.oo per share is to be
remitted by the subscriber with his subscription . .. The balance, or $3o.oo
per share allotted, will be advanced to the North American Company (herein-
after called the Company), for account and at the request of the subscriber
hereby made, and the subscriber is required and hereby undertakes to repay the
same in deferred instalments as follows: $io.oo per share on January 2, 1925;
$Io.oo per share on April 1, 1925; $IO.OO per share on July I, 1925. . . . Pre-
ferred stock issued against this subscription is to bear 6% cumulative dividends
from July X, Z924. Upon completing the above deferred payments, . .. the
subscriber or his assignee shall be entitled to receive . . . a certificate or cer-
tificates in transferable form representing the number of shares of preferred
stock subscribed and paid for. Cf. Sarback v. Kansas Fiscal Agency Co., 86
Kan. 734, 122 Pac. 113 (1912).
'Ross v. Bank of Gold Hill, 2o Nev. 191, ig Pac. 243 (i8gS).
14 Stern v. Mayer, x66 Minn. 346, 2o7 N. W. 737 (1926).
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indicates that the other party is not regarded as the holder of
the shares until he has made the final payment. 15 An "accelera-
tion clause," on the other hand, might imply the forfeiture of
presently-existing shares. 16
In the remainder of the paper I shall hurdle this difficulty of
interpretation by assuming that the original transaction between
the parties was unquestionably a contract for the future creation
of shares, and shall attempt to examine into those legal conse-
quences of such a transaction which vary according to the pres-
ence or absence of other typical facts.
SUBDIVISIONS
The subject has three distinct subdivisions: (I) contracts to
create shares which the corporation has the power to create; (2)
contracts to create shares which the corporation has no power to
create, and which disability is not overcome prior to the contract
date for the creation of the shares; (3) contracts to create shares
which the corporation has no power to create, but which disability
is overcome prior to the contract date for the creation of the
shares. This paper is limited to the first of these subdivisions;
the legal relations arising out of contracts to create shares which
the corporation has no power to create will be dealt with in a sub-
sequent article.
' The stock purchase certificates recently issued by the International Nickel
Company contained this typical clause: "Failure to pay any instalment within
the time limits above fixed and as above set forth, shall operate as a forfeiture
of all rights in respect of the subscription and the instalments previously paid
thereon. .... "
" An excellent example is to be found in the 1924 subscription agreements
of the North American Company: "In the event that the subscriber shall default
in paying any instalment when due as above specified (and time shall be of
the essence) all future instalments shall at once become due and the said
Trust Company, without notice or advertisement and at public or private sale
and at the cost of the subscriber, may at any time thereafter sell all or any part
of the stock represented by the certificates so delivered to it as security for
account of the subscriber and may apply the net proceeds, together with any
dividends theretofore received by it upon the stock in question, to the satisfaction
of the indebtedness of the subscriber. The surplus, if any, and any stock not so
sold, shall, upon satisfaction of the subscriber's indebtedness, be delivered to the
subscriber or his assignee against surrender of the initial payment receipt."
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"POWER TO CREATE SHARES"
Inasmuch as the term "power to create shares" (or an equiv-
alent short-hand expression) is an extremely useful tool in the
presentation of this subject, an explanation of the sense in which
it is herein used seems desirable. Corporation C needs more capi-
tal. The directors resolve to create additional shares. The presi-
dent of corporation C, having been authorized by the board, there-
after says to S, a prospective shareholder:
"We are willing to let you have at once IOO of our non-
voting 6 per cent. preferred shares of $ioo par value at a
total price of $75 per share to be paid upon call during the
next three months."
S responds, "I accept the offer." Does S thereby become the
holder of ioo non-voting 6 per cent. preferred shares of' corpo-
ration C, assuming that such was the intention of the parties?
This is said to depend upon whether or not the corporation had
at the time of the transaction power to create as to S shares of
the class and number in question.
But what does the term "power to create shares" mean, and
how is the existence or-non-existence of the power to be deter-
mined? Of primary importance in answering these questions are
the language and judicial interpretation of applicable statutes. Of
the diverse statutory prohibitions relating to the creation of
shares, the following are the principal types: (i) a statutory pro-
hibition against the creation of a particular class of shares, for
example, non-voting shares; "1 (2) a statutory prohibition
against creating shares of a particular class beyond a certain num-
ber, for example, limiting the number of preferred shares to two-
thirds in par value of the outstanding common shares; 18 (3) a
statutory prohibition against creating shares for a particular kind
1 In People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134
N. E. 707 (I922), art. XI, § 3 of the Illinois Constitution was construed to
secure to each shareholder the right to vote for directors.
' IDAHO COMP. STAT. (1919) § 4752 (9) : ". . . at no time shall the total
amount of the preferred stock, issued and outstanding, exceed two-thirds of the
capital stock paid in cash or property."
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of consideration, for example, labor or services; 19 (4) a stat-
utory prohibition against creating shares for less than a certain
minimum amount of consideration, for example, par value; 20
(5) a statutory prohibition against creating shares as to certain
persons, for example, enemy aliens or infants or other corpora-
tions; 21 (6) a statutory prohibition against creating shares with-
out the antecedent consent of a stipulated percentage of the share-
holders; 22 (7) a statutory prohibition against creating shares
without the antecedent consent of a public body such as the Blue
Sky Commission; 23 (8) a statutory prohibition against creat-
ing shares without first filing certain required papers or state-
ments in a designated public office.24
' MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) §41 (6): "Nothing in this Article shall
authorize the issuance of stock or personal securities for personal services to be
rendered in the future."
' Section 69 of the NEW YORK STOCK CORPoRATiON LAW (I909) provides
inter alia: "No shares of stock having par value shall be issued for money in
an amount less than the par value of such shares."
'The General Corporation Act of Illinois, ILL. Ray. STAT. (Cahill, 1927)
c. 32, § 8, provides: "No corporation shall purchase, acquire or hold, directly or
indirectly, the stock of a building corporation or of an agency and loan corpora-
tion." In a number of states, including Illinois, there are statutory provisions
prohibiting one corporation from holding shares in another if the effect may be
substantially to lessen competition.
'The Alabama Constitution, ALA. CIv. CODE (1923) §237, provides that:
"No corporation shall issue preferred stock without the consent of the owners
of two-thirds of the stock of said corporation."
ICal. Laws 1917, c. 532, as amended by Laws i919, c. 148: "Sec. 3. No.
company shall sell . . . or offer for sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take
subscriptions for any security of its own issue until it shall have first applied
for and secured from the commissioner a permit authorizing it so to do ...
Sec. 4 . . . If he finds that the proposed plan of business of the applicant is
not unfair, unjust or unequitable, that it intends to fairly and honestly transact
its business, and that the securities that it proposes to issue and the methods to
be used by it in issuing 6nd disposing of them are not such as, in his opinion, will
work a fraud upon the purchaser thereof, the commissioner shall issue to the
applicant a permit authorizing it to issue and dispose of securities, as therein
provided, in this state, in such amounts and for such considerations and upon
such terms and conditions as the commissioner may in said permit provide ...
Sec. 12. Every security issued by any company, without a permit of the commis-
sioner authorizing the same then in effect, shall be void. .. ."
" For example: "The whole or any part of any unissued balance of the
authorized capital stock may be issued, subsequent to the issue of stock certified
by the articles of organization, by vote of the directors, under authority of the
by-laws or of a general or special vote of the incorporators at the first meeting
or of the stockholders at a subsequent meeting, if, within thirty days after such
vote of the directors, a certificate signed and sworn to by the president, treasurer
and a majority of the directors is submitted to the commissioner, setting forth-
(a) the total amount of capital stock authorized; (b) the amount of stock al-
ready issued for cash payable by instalments and the amount paid thereon; also
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Stipulations corresponding to the first six of the foregoing
prohibitions may also be found in the articles of association of
various corporations. Furthermore, certain prohibitions may be
regarded as a matter of common law, such as the creation of
shares of no par value, or, under certain circumstances, the crea-
tion of shares in another corporation, without express statutory
authorization.
25
Let us return, then, to the transaction between S and cor-
poration C. Will the transaction result in the immediate creation
as to S of shares of a given class and number, as the parties in-
tended? The answer depends upon three considerations: (i)
does the transaction constitute a violation of one or more of the
foregoing prohibitions; (2) what is the legal effect of non-com-
pliance with such a prohibition; (3) what is the meaning of the
term "share"? The first of these considerations is primarily
a matter of fact, and it is upon the latter two that the question
of the feasibility of stating that the corporation has "power to
create shares" depends. It resolves itself into an analysis of the
legal relations resulting from the transaction despite non-compli-
ance with the prohibition, and secondly, a determination of
whether or not those legal relations are accurately (in the sense
of most conveniently) described by the term "shares."
If the statutes, or the provisions of the articles of associa-
tion containing the prohibitions as to the creation of shares here-
tofore enumerated, always specifically stated that no attempted
violation of the prohibition could result in the creation of shares,
and if the legal relations connoted by the term "shares" were ex-
the amount of full paid stock already issued for cash, property," services or
expenses; (c) the amount of additional' stock to be issued for cash, property,
serviceS or expenses, respectively; (d) a description of said property and a
statement of the nature of said services or expenses, in the manner required by
Section 1o. The commissioner shall examine such certificate in the same manner
as the original articles of organization. If he finds that it conforms to the
requirements of the law, he shall endorse his approval thereon, and it shall there-
upon be filed in the office of the state secretary, who, upon payment of the fee
provided in Section 55, shall cause it and the endorsement thereon to be recorded.
No issue of stock subsequent to that certified by the articles of organization shall
be lawful until said certificate is filed with the secretary as aforesaid ..
MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 156, § I6. The italics are the writer's.
' Cf. MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 77: "Probably, all authorities agree
that a corporation cannot engage in speculation in stocks, unless such speculation
is one of the expressed objects for which the company is incorporated."
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pressly set forth or uniformly understood, then the legal conse-
quences of the abortive attempt to violate the regulation would
be relatively simple. One could readily predict at least what legal
relations would not result from the transaction, and the general-
ization "no power to create shares" would have a clear meaning.
But unfortunately the sources of these prohibitions are not
thus precise. To be sure, statutes of this character frequently
state that all "increases of stock or indebtedness" in violation of
the statute "shall be void." 26 But "void" is not a self-explana-
tory word, and courts differ as to its interpretation and applica-
tion.2 7  In practically every instance such transactions will have
somne legal consequences. These can be adequately described,
when dealing with a single transaction, without the use of an ex-
pression such as "power to create shares," but when a correlation
of the legal consequences of many varying fact situations is at-.
tempted, some such general term becomes essential. Whether the
legal consequences of a given attempt to create shares in viola-
tion of a prohibition shall be described by the term "shares" is
thus a query which demands an answer.
In a future article the present writer will present an analysis
of the legal relations resulting from attempts to create shares
in violation of each of the above-mentioned prohibitions. For
the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that the precise legal
consequences of such transactions are predictable. If no pro-
hibition be violated, or if the legal consequences of the transac-
' State constitutions or statutes very commonly provide that "no corporation
shall issue stock except for money paid, labor done, or property actually received,
and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void."
Compare, for example, Sherman v. Smith, 185 Iowa 654, i69 N. W. 216
(igi9), with Lee v. Cameron, 67 Okla. 8o, i69 Pac. 17 (0917). In the Iowa
case there was a statute requiring permission from the executive council if it
were proposed to create shares for something other than cash, and providing that
"shares" created in violation of the statute should be "void." In an action to en-
force promissory notes given in return for "shares" falsely certified to the coun-
cil as created for money, the court held that consideration for the notes was not
lacking, although no permission had been obtained to create shares for anything
but money. In the Oklahoma case there was a constitutional provision that "no
corporation shall issue stock except for money, labor done, or property actually
received to the amount of the par value thereof, and all fictitious increases of
stock or indebtedness shall be void" In an action to cancel "shares" purported
to have been created as to D by the P corporation for 40 per cent. of par, it was
held that neither D nor an innocent transferee for value from D became a share-
holder by virtue of either transaction.
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tion, even though in violation of the prohibition, are no different,
at least in the particulars heretofore set forth in defining the norm
of a "share," 28 than if the prohibition had not been violated,
then the transaction will herein be described as within the cor-
poration's "power to create shares." But if the legal consequences
of the transaction, in any of the respects enumerated in the fore-
going definition of "shares," will be different than if the prohibi-
tion had been complied with, then the corporation will be said to
have "no power to create shares" by such a transaction.
CONTRACTS TO CREATE SHARES WHICH THE CORPORATION HAS
THE POWER TO CREATE
Cases involving this type of contract are almost uniformly
concerned with some phase of this question: what are the legal
relations between the parties when the time for performance has
arrived? Especially when confronted with an action by the cor-
poration to obtain the contract price of the shares, courts tend to
resolve their doubts as to the "nature" of the transaction by char-
acterizing it under some circumstances as a "subscription" and
under others as a "purchase and sale" of property."9 Such verbi-
age, however, merely serves to becloud three important and insep-
arable problems.
In the first place, when the stipulated date for performance
of the contract has arrived (or if no specific date is set, when a
reasonable time has elapsed), does the other party automatically
become the holder of the shares contracted for, or is some fur-
-ther act, either on his part or on the part of the corporation or
See supra p. 754.
SIn Marson v. Deither, 49 Minn. 423, 52 N. W. 38 (892), after holding
that non-tender of a certificate is no defense to payment of a 40 per cent. "call"
on a "subscriptionf' made by the assignee of an insolvent corporation for the
benefit of its creditors, the court added, at 427, 52 N. W. at 39: "The rule, of
course, has no application to the case of a sale of stock, which stands on the
same footing as any other contract of purchase of property." This distinction
was quoted with approval in Barnard v. Tidrick, 35 S. D. 403, 152 N. W. 690
(915). In Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, supra note in, in limiting the
corporation to damages rather than the full contract price, the court said, at 312,
132 At. at 495: "Upon an examination of the contract we have reached the
conclusion that it is not a subscription agreement, but a contract for the sale of
stock controlled by the law appertaining to the sale of goods."
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both, a pre-requisite to the existence of such shareholdership? 30
This may be regarded as analogous to those ofttimes fruitless
inquiries in sales cases as to whether or not the "property" or
the "title" has passed to the buyer.3 1 The theory behind this
question is, of course, that one cannot be made a shareholder in
a corporation without his consent, nor can he become a share-
holder without the consent of the corporation, '32 and that conse-
quently such acts of consent are essential to the creation of the
shares on the agreed date, unless the mere acts of the parties in
entering into the contract may be regarded as continuing mani-
festations of consent to the creation of the shares, culminating
in shareholdership on the date for performance. A carefully
drawn contract will, to be sure, explicitly provide the legal rela-
tions of the parties when the contract date for the creation of the
shares arrives, 33 and in the absence of such stipulations the only
feasible course is neither to affirm nor to deny that a status of
'Happily, some few courts have clearly recognized the confusion latent in
the term "subscription." Examine, for example, the case of Kruse v. Hudson
County Brewing Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 392, 82 Atl. 104 (1911), in which Vice Chan-
cellor Garrison said, at 404, 82 Atl. at io9: "What the rights are of one who
subscribes to capital stock must, in each instance, be determined by the contract
between him and the company; and the words 'subscriber to capital stock' can-
not be held to have a fixed, definite and unchangeable meaning. In one case, by
the terms of the contract, the so-called 'subscriber' may have immediately
become a stockholder; in another case, he might not become a stockholder until
he had paid certain sums of money; and so through all the variations that con-
tractual relations are subject to as regulated by their terms."
I Cf. U.NIFoRm SAus AcT, § 63 (i) : "Where, under a contract to sell or a
sale, the 'property' in the goods has passed to the buyer, and the buyer wrong-
fully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the
contract or the sale, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price
of the goods"; with § 64 (I) : "Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses
to 'accept' and pay for the goods, the seller may maintain an action against him
for damages for non-acceptance." The quotation marks and italics are those of
the writer.
'Cf. Foote v. Anderson, 123 Fed. 659 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903). In holding
that the mere fact that a certain bank's stock-book set forth that the defendant
owned 135 shares was not sufficient evidence to subject him to a shareholder's
statutory responsibility to creditors of the bank, the court said, at 66i: "It is
clear that a corporation by its own act cannot make one its shareholder, nor can
one make himself a shareholder without the consent of the corporation. The
corporation may evidence its assent to the creation of the relation by placing on
its books the name of one as a shareholder, and that act may evidence, as against
the company, the contract, and a person, by knowledge of and acquiescence in
such act, may be held a stockholder; but it is equally clear that, this relation
being one based on mutual consent, neither party by its or his own separate act
can create it. It requires assent of both to bind."
' See supra note 7.
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shareholdership has resulted without a detailed examination into
the respective legal consequences of the transaction on or after
the contract date for performance.34
The second major problem inherent in every contract for
the future creation of shares is: what acts did the parties respec-
tively undertake to perform, or in other words, what acts by each
constitute performance or at least "substantial" performance of
the bargain. If we assume that shareholdership does not ipso
facto result as to the other party upon the arrival of the contract
date for the creation of the shares, and that the contract therefore
contemplates further action on the part of the corporation, what
are the acts which performance of the contract requires of the
corporation? Is any unequivocal recognition of the other party
as the holder of the shares contracted for sufficient, such as enter-
ing him as a shareholder on the books of the corporation, sending
him notices of shareholders' meetings, etc., or is the tender of a
share certificate or an equivalent instrument to the other party
in every case an essential element of substantial performance by
the corporation, unless the contract specifically provides other-
wise? Even if we assume that shareholdership does automati-
cally result on the contract date for the creation of the shares, the
question still remains as to whether the mere existence of this
status constitutes corporate performance of the bargain, or
whether the corporation is in default until it has at least made
a share certificate or equivalent instrument available to the other
party. In many cases arising out of contracts for the future crea-
tion of shares much perplexing debate might be avoided by a
clear-cut recognition that the ultimate issue is solely what consti-
tutes performance of the agreement. As will be hereafter de-
veloped, in the last analysis the determination of this question
depends not upon the "intention" of the parties, where no specific
intention is clearly manifested, but upon the customs of the par-
ticular economic "institution" involved, i. e., upon the typical
reactions of those engaged in marketing and investing in cor-
porate shares.
See supra notes 5 and 6.
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The foregoing consideration of what acts constitute per-
formance of the contract leads inevitably to the third problem
latent, but seldom articulate, in cases arising out of these con-
tracts. Are the promises of the parties independent or mutually
dependent? If the corporation has promised to deliver a share
certificate to the other party on a certain date, and he has prom-
ised to pay the agreed price on a certain date (not necessarily the
same date), under what circumstances if any will the corporation
have a right to the price without first tendering the certificate;
or, conversely, under what circumstances if any will the other
party have a right to the certificate without first tendering the
price? A study of the rules for determining whether contractual
promises are independent or mutually dependent is beyond the
scope of this paper, 33 and the question is here emphasized merely
because many of the controversies resulting from contracts for
the future creation of shares might have been avoided had the
draftsmen of such contracts been conscious of this problem.30
*' For the classical exposition of the rules for determining whether the duties
of the parties to a bi-lateral contract are independent or mutually conditional, see
the footnote by the reporter, Sergeant Williams, to the case of Pordage v. Cole,
I Wins. Saunders 319 (1669), CORIN, CASES ON CONTRAcTS (1921) 5o8. For
modern applications examine Noyes v. Brown, 142 Minn. 211, 171 N. W. 8o3
(1919), CoRBIN, 522; International Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. I, io8
N. E. 469 (1915), CoRI1N, 529. For a detailed study of the problem see 2
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 816, et seq.
An apparent conflict of decisions in a given jurisdiction may be merely an
implicit judicial recognition that in one transaction for the creation of shares
mutually dependent duties resulted, while in another the duties of the corpora-
tion and of the other party were independent. For example, in St. Paul, etc.,
R. R. v. Robbins, supra note 1o, the defendant- signed the "stock-subscription
book" of the plaintiff and promised to pay for the number of shares set opposite
his name. In an action to recover the amount of the "subscription" non-tender
of a certificate was allowed as a defense on the express grounds (at 442) that
the two promises were "concurrent and dependent." In Columbia Electric Co. v.
Dixon, 46 Minn. 463, 49 N. W. 244 (1891), the defendant "subscribed" for cer-
tain shares in the plaintiff corporation and gave his promissory note therefor to
the plaintiff. In an action to enforce payment of the note, non-tender of a cer-
tificate was not allowed as a defense. This illustrates the English view ap-
proved by Professor Langdell in his SUMMARY OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 188o)
I5o, but by the weight of authority in this country the promise in a promissory
note is treated as conditional upon the performance of a promise given in a sepa-
rate instrument in exchange for the note. See 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note
35, § 840. In Indiana, for example, this view was adopted at an early date by
McCulloch v. Dawson, 1 Ind. 413 (1849); hence, in that state, failure of the
plaintiff corporation to allege affirmatively tender of a certificate was allowed as
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UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE CONTRACT DATE FOR PERFORMANCE
IS TENDER TO THE OTHER PARTY OF A CERTIFICATE FOR
THE SHARES CONTRACTED FOR A CONDITION TO
THE CORPORATION'S RIGHT TO THE
PURCHASE PRICE?
The courts and text-writers almost universally agree that in
the case of a "subscription" to shares tender of a share certificate
is not pre-requisite to a right in the corporation to the contract
price, whereas in the case of a "purchase" of shares from the
corporation, the duty of the other party to pay the contract price
is contingent upon the tender to him of a certificate.3 ' Unfor-
tunately, however, the authorities fail to indicate in what way a
"subscription" is to be distinguished from a "purchase" or the
reasons for this distinction.
a defense to an action to enforce payment of a promissory note given by the
defendant to the plaintiff pursuant to his "subscription." Summers v. Sleeth,
45 Ind. 598 (1874).
Furthermore, a duty to make a partial payment of a "subscription" may be
regarded as independent of performance by the corporation as in Marson v.
Deither, supra note 29, whereas the duty to pay in full or to pay a final instal-
ment may be regarded as dependent upon corporate performance, including
tender of a certificate.
Cf. Walter A. Wood Harvester Co. v. Robbins, 56 Minn. 48, 50, 57 N. W.
317, 318 (1893), which held that "a tender of the certificate of stock is not a
condition precedent to a right of action to recover an instalment of the stock
subscription," with Walter A. Wood Harvester Co. v. Jefferson, 57 Minn. 456,
460, 59 N. W. 532, 533 (1894), which held that "a readiness and willingness,
however, to deliver the certificate must be alleged in the complaint in actions for
the whole amount 4ubscribed, or to enforce payment of the final instalment of
the amount subscribed." The italics are the writer's.
See Note, Necessity of Issuance or Tender of Stock Certificate to Render
Subscriber Liable as a Stockholder (1915) L. R. A. 1915A 465, 468: "The doc-
trine that a tender of a stock certificate is not a condition precedent to an action
by the corporation to recover the subscription, or to the liability of the subscriber
on his subscription, is expressly limited, in some cases, to subscriptions as distin-
guished from sales. . . . When there is a sale of corporate stock as dis-
tinguished from a subscription, the corporation cannot maintain an action on the
contract without offering to deliver, or having ready for delivery, the stock.
." See also BALLANTINE, PRIVAT COaRORATIONS (1927) io8: "In case of
a contract to purchase shares the delivery of the certificates and the payment of
the price are usually intended by the parties to be concurrent acts. Neither
party can ordinarily sue the other without a tender of performance, and the pur-
chaser will not become a shareholder until the certificates have been indorsed
and delivered. But in case of a subscription it is not ordinarily necessary either
that the certificates be tendered or that the subscription price be paid. It is well
settled that the issue or tender of a certificate of stock is not a condition prece-
dent to the right of a corporation to make calls or maintain an action on a sub-
scription for stock. . . " The italics are the writer's. See 5 THoMPsoN,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 3808.
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One possible difference between these two types of transac-
tions suggested by the cases and texts is solely as to the facts in-
volved. In the case of a "subscription" the very word "subscribe"
is used, or the other party signs an instrument headed "subscrip-
tion list," and the transaction between the other party and the
corporation is part of a campaign by the corporation to market a
block of shares and is merely one of a number of similar trans-
actions between the corporation and other persons. whereas in the
case of a "purchase" the term "subscribe" or "subscription" does
not appear and the transaction between the other party and the
corporation is an isolated one and unconnected with any general
offering of shares by the corporation to the public or to its share-
holders. But there would appear to be nothing inherent in such
a factual difference between the two types of transactions which
would justify dispensing with tender of a certificate in the one
case as a pre-requisite to a right to payment, and requiring it in
the other.
A more plausible distinction suggested by a careful examina-
tion of the cases is that the courts use the term "subscription" to
describe a transaction whereby the other party is regarded as
having at once become a shareholder, even prior to payment or
tender of a certificate,38 and the term "purchase" to designate a
E. g., a careful study of the cases cited in the L. R. A. note, supra note 37,
for the proposition that "tender of a stock certificate is not a condition prece-
dent . . . to the liability of the subscriber on his subscription" reveals that in
every such case the court regarded the other party as having become a share-
holder and frequently expressly emphasized that fact. Examine: Chandler v.
Northern Cross R. R., 18 Ill. I9O (1856) ; New Albany & Salem . R. v. McCor-
mick, IO Ind. 499 (858) ; Slipher v. Earhart, 83 Ind. 173 (1882) ; W"aukon &
Mississippi R. R. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa 121, 125 (I878) ("a subscriber to stock
becomes a stockholder by virtue of the subscription in the absence of a provision
requiring payment as a condition of membership; and that, too, without the
receiving of any certificate of stock"); Smith & Davis v. Gower, 2 Duv. 17
(Ky. 1865) ; Glenn v. Rosborough, 48 S. C. 272, 26 S. E. 611 (1896) ; Astoria,
etc., Ry. v. Hill, 20 Ore. i77, 18I, 25 Pac. 379, 380 (i89o) ("The effect of the
ordinary subscription to the capital stock of a corporation is to constitute the
subscriber a shareholder immediately, with the right to vote at meetings and
share in the dividends, and subject him to a liability to contribute to the amount
of his subscription when called upon in a legal manner. . . . It has been
repeatedly held that the tender of a certificate for shares is never a condition
precedent to the liability of a sharcholder to contribute the amount of his share
after a proper call." The italics are the writer's.) See Delaware R. R. v.
Thorp, I Houst. 149, 155 (Del. I855), where the court said: "We think there is
no substantial distinction in the charter between the meaning of the terms sub-
scriber and stockholder as indifferently employed in it, and that a subscriber may
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transaction in which the vesting of shareholdership in the other
party is regarded by the courts as being postponed until the hap-
pening of a future event, normally payment of the agreed price. 39
As a basis for determining whether tender of a share certificate
is a pre-requisite to the corporation's right to the price, this dis-
tinction between a "subscription" and a "purchase" is as unten-
able as the factual differentiation indicated above.
Such emphasis upon the status of the other party is mis-
placed. The real issue is: (i) whether the bargain is to be con-
strued as requiring payment by the other party on a given date
ifidependently of any question of "performance" by the corpo-
ration; 40 or (2) whether, if the bargain be construed as making
be sued even under this charter for arrears due from him on his subscription
without proof that certificates of stock had been issued or tendered to him."
Kennebec & Portland R. R. v. Jarvis, 34 Me. 360 (1852) ; see Robson v. Fenni-
man Co., 83 N. J. L. 453, 457, 85 AtI. 356, 358 (1912) ("The subscription of the
plaintiff, and its acceptance by the corporation, were considered by both parties
as constituting the plaintiff a stockholder of the company. . ").
The following recent cases also support the conclusion that if the other
party is regarded by the court as having become a shareholder, tender to him of
a share certificate is not a prerequisite to his duty to pay the agreed price:
Eastern States, etc., Exposition v. Vail's Estate, 96 Vt. 517, 121 Atl. 415 (1923) ;
Preston v. Jeffers, 179 Ky. 384, 200 S. W. 654 (1918); Skluzacek v. Forsum,
139 Minn. 498, 166 N. W. 124 (1918); Doyon v. Fogleson, 46 S. D. 290, 192
N. W. 752 (1923) ; Majors v. Girdner, 31 Cal. App. 47, i59 Pac. 826 (i916) ;
Gallatin County Farmers' Alliance v. Flannery, 59 Mont. 534, 197 Pac. 996
(i921); Kennebec Housing Co. v. Barton, 123 Me. 293, 122 Atl. 852 (1923) ;
First Caldwell Oil Co. v. Hunt, ioo N. J. L. 308, ioi N. J. L. 240, 127 Atl.
209 (925).
In each of the following cases in which tender of a share certificate to the
other party was held to be a condition precedent to a right in the corporation to
recover the agreed price from him, the court apparently regarded the other party
as not having become a shareholder: Baird v. Kiline, 53 N. D. 244, 205 N. W.
68I (1925) ; Phillips v. Matthews, 205 Ala. 480, 88 So. 641 (i2i) ; It re Hall,
supra note 9; Summers v. Sleeth, supra note 36; St. Paul, etc., R. R. v. Robbins,
supra note Io; Considerant v. Brisbane, 14 How. 487 (N. Y. 1857); Barnard v.
Tidrick, supra note 2; cf. Lincoln Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sheldon, 44 Neb. 279, 62
N. W. 48o (895) ; see Marlatt v. Coutoure, 41 N. D. 127, 132, i69 N. W. 582,
584 (I918). In St. Paul, etc., R. R. v. Robbins, sitpra, the court said, at 441:
"It appears from the complaint that, at the time of this subscription, the com-
pany was fully organized, so that it does not stand upon precisely the same foot-
ing as a subscription made prior to, and for the purpose of effecting, the organ-
ization. Such a subscription gives to the subscriber an interest in the corpora-
tion, and the right to take part in organizing it, and this interest and right are a
sufficient consideration to support his promise. But the subscription in this case
does not appear to have been to the original stock. . . . The mere subscription
to this stock, while it constitutes a valid contract on the part of the company to
issue the stock to defendant upon his paying for it, and, on his part, to receive
and pay for it, does not give him an interest in the company, nor vest in him the
title to the stock."
" &0 See supra note 35.
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the right to payment and the right to "performance" by the cor-
poration mutually dependent, the corporation should be regarded
as having sufficiently performed in the absence of a tender of a
certificate.
In many contracts for the future creation of shares pay-
ment in full by the other party antedates any duty of the cor-
poration to tender a certificate, as, for example, in the case of
convertible bonds, loans secured by a pledge of "unissued
shares," and stock dividend warrants. Although many problems
involving the status of the other party may arise out of such
transactions, their facts exclude the question now under consid-
eration, namely, the duty of the corporation to tender a certifi-
cate as a condition precedent to a right to the agreed price.
The modern tendency is so strongly opposed to construing
duties in bi-lateral contracts as mutually independent that, in the
absence of an express contrary intention of the parties, the duties
of the corporation and of the other party will normally be held
to be mutually and concurrently conditional. 41  Moreover, if in
some few instances the right of the corporation to the contract
price of the shares be regarded as totally independent of any per-
formance on its part, the question as to what constitutes perform-
ance on the part of the corporation and the related question as
to whether or not the other party has acquired the status of a
holder of the shares contracted for are, of course, immaterial.
Where, however, the duties arising out of a contract for the fu-
ture creation of shares are mutually dependent, most courts seem
to regard the status of the other party at the time of the suit for
the contract price as decisive of his duty to pay: if he is then a
holder of the shares contracted for he must pay the agreed price;
if he is not, he has a defense.
42
Upon the arrival of the contract date for the creation of the
shares the other party may automatically become a holder of the
' See 2 WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra note 35, § 835: "Since concurrent condi-
tions protect both parties, courts endeavor, so far as is not inconsistent with the
expressed intention of the parties, to construe performances of mutual promises
as concurrent conditions." Courtright v. Deeds, 37 Iowa 503 (873). But cf.
Farmers' Mutual Telephone Co. v. Howell, 132 Iowa 22, io9 N. W. 294 (19o6).
"See supra notes 38 and 39.
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shares contracted for even though no certificate has as yet been
tendered him. If he does not, then further action is necessary.
This will usually be some form of recognition of him as a share-
holder by the corporation, such as tendering him a share certifi-
cate, entering him on the register of shareholders, sending him
notice of shareholders' meetings, etc. If such shareholdership
could result only by tender to him of a share certificate, then, of
course, a rule requiring shareholdership as the condition prece-
dent to his duty to pay would be identical with a rule requiring
a tender of a certificate as a condition precedent. But tender of
a certificate is not essential to the creation of shares. Consequently,
courts which allow non-tender of a certificate as the sole defense
to the payment of the purchase price must do so not because the
other party is regarded as not having become a holder of the
shares contracted for, but because they regard tender of a certifi-
cate as an essential element in performance by the corporation
of its part of the bargain, regardless of whether or not the shares
contracted for have been created as to the other party at the time
of the suit.
Throughout this discussion it is assumed that the contract
does not expressly or by reasonable implication indicate the inten-
tion of the parties as to whether the duty to pay the agreed price
is to be contingent on tender of an appropriate certificate or not.
Under what circumstances, then, should performance by the cor-
poration of the conditions precedent to its right to the price be
construed to include tender to the other party of the certificate?
The question can be answered only by determining the degree of
importance in the commercial world of possession of such a cer-
tificate. In the case of a small, closed corporation, possession of
a share certificate may be of relatively slight importance to the
other party once he has acquired the shareholdership contracted
for. But where the transaction involves a large corporation whose
shares are listed on a recognized exchange and are actively dealt
in, the commercial correlation between a share certificate and the
shares it evidences may be so great that without a certificate the
other party would be seriously handicapped in the enjoyment of
that which he sought by the contract, even though technically he
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had acquired the contemplated shareholdership. 4 Under these
latter circumstances the courts might well deem the corporation's
performance as not substantially complete until it had tendered to
the other party a share certificate or an instrument which those
dealing therein would regard as its equivalent.
44
WHAT IS THE MEASURE OF THE CORPORATION'S CLAIM AGAINST
THE OTHER PARTY?
Where the corporation has performed all conditions prece-
dent to its right to payment and the other party is in default, can
it recover from him the full contract price or only damages meas-
ured by the excess of the contract price over the market value of
the shares? The authorities approach this problem too by inquir-
ing whether the transaction was a "subscription" or a "sale." '5
In the case of a "subscription," particularly a pre-incorporation
subscription, the right of the corporation to recover the full con-
tract price is unquestioned.46 But if the transaction be regarded
4' An analogous situation is presented by a "sale c. i. f." where delivery of
"shipping documents" (i. e. bill of lading, invoice, insurance policy) by the seller
to the buyer may be a prerequisite to the seller's right to the purchase price,
even though the goods have arrived safely, been delivered to the buyer, and the
"property" therein is regarded by the court as having passed to the buyer.
Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisa v. J. Aron & Co., Inc., 16 F. (2d) 185 (C. C. A. 2d,
1926); Orient Co. Ltd. v. Brekke & Howlid, [1913] 1 K. B. 531; Harper v.
Hockstim, 278 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), 2o A. L. R. 1232 (1922) ; cf. Lundy
v. S. Pfeifer & Co., 162 La. 355, Ito So. 556 (1926).
"The importance of possession of a share certificate has been enhanced by
the provision of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § i, that title to a certificate
and to the shares represented thereby can be transferred only by delivery of the
certificate.
I See Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, supra note ii, in which the de-
fendant signed an agreement as follows: "The undersigned hereby purchases
fifty shares of the C corporation at $io.oo per share." In construing the agree-
ment the court said, at 312, 132 Atl. at 495: "Upon an examination of the con-
tract we have reached the conclusion that it is not a subscription agreement, but
a contract for the sale of stock controlled by the law appertaining to the sale of
goods." Cf. Lincoln Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sheldon, supra note 39, in which the
defendant signed the following agreement: "For value received we, the under-
signed subscribers, hereby bind ourselves to purchase the number of shares of
stock set opposite our names in the L company at $5o.oo per share." In con-
struing this agreement the court said, at 288, 62 N. W. at 482: "'Arhile it is true
that the word 'purchase' is in the contract, yet we are unable to construe this
contract as a contract of sale of stock."
" In some jurisdictions, especially in the New England states, the right of
the corporation against the subscriber is held to exist only if he expressly prom-
ised to pay, the remedy of the corporation in the absence of such an express
promise being limited to a forfeiture. See i Coox, op. cit. supra note 2, § 74;
. THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 3764.
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as analogous to a "contract to sell," there is no uniform rule as
to the amount of the corporation's recovery.
47
Prior to the Sales Act there were three lines of cases deal-
ing with the amount the seller might recover if the buyer breached
his contract: (i) the "English" view, followed by nearly half
the states, that the difference between the contract price and the
market value of the goods was always the measure of the seller's
recovery; 48 (2) the "New York" view, accepted in a number
of states, that the seller, by not only tendering the goods to the
buyer but also setting them aside for him, may always recover the
full price; 49 (3) a middle view, held in New Hampshire and a
few other states, accepting the New York rule where the goods
were" not readily marketable at a fair price but adopting the Eng-
lish rule in all other cases.50 The Sales Act, enacted in twenty-
' The cases which, in considering the amount of the corporation's recovery
against the other party, suggest a distinction between a subscription to shares
and a sale of shares apparently use the term "sale" to refer to a transbaction for
"treasury shares," but even as to such "sale" there is no uniform rule as to the
amount of the corporations recovery. In the case of Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc.
v. Taverna, supra note ii, the court emphasized the fact that the agreement
might have been for "treasury shares" (although the agreement expressed no
such intent, nor did the evidence reveal that the corporation had any "treasury
shares"), and on this basis limited the corporation's recovery to the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time the other party
refused to perform. In Lincoln Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sheldon, supra note 39, on
the other hand, the court expressly refused to construe the agreement as refer-
ring to "treasury shares" and gave judgment for the full contract price. Fur-
thermore, in the case of Button v. Cities Fuel & Power Co., 3oo Fed. 28o (C. C.
A. 4th, 1924), 266 U. S. 619, 45 Sup. Ct. 98 (1924), the court granted a recovery
against the other party of the full contract price, although the agreement clearly
involved "treasury shares."
Although a detailed analysis of "treasury shares" is beyond the scope of
this paper, some confusion might be avoided by reiterating that a corporation is
never in any useful sense a shareholder with respect to its own shares; the term
"treasury shares" merely refers to a power in the corporation to create certain
shares, which power it acquired in a particular way, to wit, by the surrender or
cancellation of shares formerly outstanding, in contradistinction to power to
create shares resulting from the corporation's original authority not as yet
exercised. Although for other purposes there may be justifiable distinctions
between "treasury shares" and "authorized but unissued capital stock," for the
purpose of determining the amount of the corporation's recovery upon a con-
tract to create shares the source of its present power to create shares of the
class and number contracted for would appear to be immaterial. Indeed, if the
corporation tenders "treasury shares" to the other party, he will normally be
benefited by the fact that fewer shares of that class will be outstanding than if
the corporation had tendered him part of its "authorized but unissued capital
stock."
"2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 562.
,Ibid.
Ibid. § 564.
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nine jurisdictions, including all of the important commercial
states, adopts the third view.-"
But the Sales Act does not apply to contracts for the crea-
tion of shares; nor is there sufficient analogy between a sale of
tangible personal property and a creation of shares to compel an
application of the sales rules to the latter situation. The amount
which the corporation should be permitted to recovef is a sui
generis proposition as to which there is little direct authority.
Cases involving a transfer of shares by one shareholder to an-
other present quite different considerations.
In the case of a sale of goods, if the "property" has passed
to the buyer and the seller is not in default the seller may always
enforce payment of the contract price.52  Similarly, as has been
noted, if the shareholdership contracted for has resulted and the
corporation is not in default it has a right to the full contract
price. In the case of a contract to sell goods, the "property" not
having passed to the buyer, many writers believe that to give the
seller who still has "title" an action for the full contract price is
anomalous. 53  However justified such an attitude may be with
respect to contracts to sell goods, it finds no parallel in contracts
to create shares. The unpaid seller of the goods still has the
goods; his damage is the temporary loss of the advantage of a
sale. The unpaid corporation has nothing, since it is never in
any useful sense a holder of its own shares. It can acquire sub-
stance only by the receipt of capital pursuant to contracts to cre-
ate shares, and not to entitle the corporation to enforce payment
in full of such contracts is to withhold from it its life-blood.
In modern corporate financing the initial working capital of
newly organized corporations is frequently obtained, not as a re-
sult of pre-incorporation subscriptions (unquestionably enforce-
able in full), but through the medium of contracts to create shares
entered into by the corporation shortly after the formalities of
incorporating have been complied with. Moreover, even where
corporations have long been in existence, plans for expansion or
re-organization frequently involve complicated and delicately bal-
"' UNIFORM SALES AcT, § 63 (3).
t22 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 48, § 561.
W2 WILISTON, op. cit. supra note 48, § 565.
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anced financial arrangements that would be defeated or seriously
hampered with no proportionate gain to anyone, if those who had
agreed to contribute definite sums to the corporation's capital
could not be made to pay the full amount. Furthermore, the
difficulty heretofore emphasized of determining whether or not
one is a shareholder and of differentiating, factually or logically,
between pre-incorporation and post-incorporation agreements to
become a shareholder renders desirable a uniform rule in all such
cases as to the amount of the corporation's recovery upon breach
by the other party. These reasons, combined with a moralistic
sympathy toward any extension of the doctrine of specific per-
formance, recommend that if payment of the contract price be
past due and the corporation itself be not in default it should be
granted a recovery of the full amount, regardless of whether or
not the other party has become the holder of the shares contracted
for, and without reference to whether the transaction was entered
into pr ior to incorporation or thereafter.
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If the other party is compelled to pay the contract price for
the shares, it would seem beyond question that following the en-
forced payment he should be entitled to recognition as a share-
holder whether or not he was prior thereto.5 Consequently, the
corporation should have the election either of rescinding the trans-
action and making the other party pay damages, measured by the
excess of the contract price over the reasonable sale value of the
shares, or of affirming the transaction and compelling payment
of the full contract price. The further problem presents itself,
however, as to whether or not the other party can, at his election,
refuse to become a shareholder despite such enforced perform-
ance of his contract. For instance, corporation C contracts with
S to create ten common shares as to him on May I, and in return
" Accord: Smith v. General Motors Corp., 289 Fed. 205 (C. C. A. 6th,
1923) ; Scranton Axle & Spring Co. v. Scranton Board of Trade, 271 Pa. 6,
113 At. 838 (1921) ; Button v. Cities Fuel & Power Co., supra note 47; Provi-
dent Gold Mining Co. v. Security Co., i68 Cal. 304, I42 Pac. 884 (1914) ; Lin-
coln Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sheldon, supra note 39. Contra: Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc.
v. Taverna, supra note II.
'In Button v. Cities Fuel & Power Co., supra note 47, after decreeing pay-
ment of the full contract price, the lower court said, at 298: "It follows, of
course, that Doherty, when these payments have been properly made, will be
entitled to the 2oooo shares of stock."
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S agrees to pay $iooo.oo on that date. On May I, corporation
C tenders S a certificate for ten shares which he refuses to ac-
cept. Corporation C thereafter obtains a judgment against S for
$iooo.oo. S pays $iooo.oo to C but notifies the corporation that
he does not want to be registered as a shareholder or to receive a
certificate or to have anything to do with the corporation. Would
S thereafter be a shareholder? For example, if a statute imposed
upon shareholders a responsibility to corporate creditors, would S
be subject to such responsibility? If the suit by corporation C
against S be regarded as in the nature of a bill for specific per-
formance, then S would probably be held to such a statutory re-
sponsibility, for one of the benefits to the shareholders of cor-
poration C (the real parties in interest behind the corporate
entity) of performance of the contract is the acquisition by S
of this statutory duty.
DOES BANKRUPTCY OF THE CORPORATION UPON THE CONTRACT
DATE FOR THE CREATION OF THE SHARES TERMI-
NATE ITS CLAIM AGAINST THE OTHER
PARTY FOR THE CONTRACT PRICE?
Minnesota appears to be the only state which has thus far
decided this question. In the case of Stern v. Mayer " the de-
fendant signed an instrument whereby he purported to "sub-
scribe" for five shares in corporation C, and agreed "to take the
same when issued and to pay for the same $8oo.oo" in yearly
instalments of seventy-two dollars. The corporation agreed "to
issue and deliver the stock when the amount paid with interest
thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from the date of each payment
shall equal the subscription price of the stock." The instrument
also contained a forfeiture clause. Subsequent to the execution
of this agreement corporation C was adjudged a bankrupt and
the plaintiff, as trustee, sought to recover from the defendant an
alleged balance unpaid on the agreement. The court sustained
a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the writing con-
stituted a "sale" of shares and not a "subscription," that the de-
' Supra note 14, at 347, 207 N. W. at 737; Note (1927) 46 A. L. R. 1172.
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fendant did not thereby become a shareholder, and that the bank-
ruptcy of the corporation resulted in a "complete destruction of
the subject matter which makes performance impossible."
In the decision of such a case the interpretation of the agree-
ment is obviously of extreme importance. If the defendant were
unquestionably a shareholder (for example, if he had been the
transferee with notice of an existing shareholder and had been
registered on the corporate books as such), the bankruptcy of the
corporation would clearly not exonerate him from the payment
of any balance due on the shares for the benefit of the corpora-
tion's creditors. Where, however, as in the instant case, the de-
fendant has dealt directly with the corporation and has neither
claimed nor received any benefits of shareholdership, it may be
practically impossible to determine categorically whether or not
he became a shareholder by virtue of the transaction, if the inten-
tion of the parties with respect thereto is not clearly manifested.
Under such circumstances, in the absence of other facts creating
equities in favor of the corporation's creditors against the de-
fendant, it would seem proper to regard the intervening bank-
ruptcy of the corporation as a defense to further payments on
the agreement. But the question of the defendant's status is not
necessarily decisive, for even though the agreement evidenced a
clear intent that the defendant was not to become a shareholder
until the final payment agreed upon, if the defendant had been
held out to corporate creditors with his consent as a shareholder
(for example, by the publication of a statement by the corporation
with the knowledge of the defendant that his advance payments
had been credited to the "capital" of the corporation), the trustee
in bankruptcy, on behalf of the corporation's creditors, might rea-
sonably be accorded a claim against the defendant for the unpaid
balance of the agreed price.
HAS THE OTHER PARTY A RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
BY THE CORPORATION?
Thus far only suits by the corporation upon the other party's
breach of the contract have been considered. A more complex
situation is presented by the cases dealing with the remedies of
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the other party where the corporation is in default. 57  Upon the
deliberate refusal of the corporation to comply with the other
party's demand for the shares contracted for on or within a rea-
sonable time after the date for their creation, he may maintain
a bill for specific performance provided: (i) shares of the class
and number contracted for are not readily obtainable elsewhere;
or (2) the reasonable sale value of such shares is indetermin-
able; and (3) the rights of existing shareholders will not be
thereby violated.5 s
In order to defeat the other party's claim to specific perform-
ance, it must always appear that he did not automatically become
a shareholder upon the agreed date; for if he became a share-
holder and his action is regarded as one to compel the corpora-
tion specifically to recognize him as such, the fact that similar
shares are readily obtainable elsewhere will not be allowed as a
defense.5" In short, equity is unwilling to compel the corpora-
'Unless the contract to create shares clearly indicates that the other party
is not to become a shareholder on or after the agreed date until the corporation
has done some further act, such as issuing a certificate or accepting tender of
payment, the courts tend to regard the other party, if he is not in default, as
holder of the shares contracted for when the agreed date has arrived. Conse-
quently, there are few cases involving specific performance of a contract to
create shares as distinguished from actions for specific recognition of the plain-
tiff as an existing shareholder. Furthermore, in many cases in which the plain-
tiff might have obtained specific performance he has been content to sue at law
for damages. See infra p. 78o.
' Baumhoff v. St. Louis & Kirkwood R. R., 205 Mo. 248, 104 S. W. 5
(Q907) (specific performance granted, the value of the shares being indeter-
minable) ; Pendery v. Carelton, 87 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 8th, i898) (specific per-
formance granted, and the plaintiff awarded that fraction of the corporation's
assets which the shares contracted for would have entitled him to, the corpora-
tion having in the interim sold all of its property and ceased to do business) ;
Barker v. Troy & Rutland R. R., 27 Vt. 766 (1855) (plaintiff awarded an elec-
tion to require defendant either to deliver the shares or to pay the highest mar-
ket value of the shares after the suit was begun and before final judgment) ;
Ross v. Union Pacific Ry., Fed. Cas. No. 12,080 (C. C. Kan. 1863) (specific
performance denied, the shares being readily purchasable elsewhere); Bernier
v. Griscom-Spencer Co., 161 Fed. 438 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i9o8) (specific per-
formance denied, there being no proof that the shares could not be readily pur-
chased elsewhere or that they had any peculiar value) ; Kruse v. Hudson County
Brewing Co., supra note 3o (specific performance denied on the ground that
there were no "equities" in favor of the plaintiff; the case contains an excel-
lent discussion of the ambiguity of the terms "subscriber" and "subscription
contract").
"' Moore v. Truitt, 97 Okla. 288, 223 Pac. 708 (1924) ; Applegate v. Wells-
burg B. & T. Co., 68 W. Va. 477, 69 S. E. goi (igio); Robey v. Hardy, 63
Utah 231, 224 Pac. 889 (1924) ; Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365
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tion to increase the number of units into which its membership
is divided if similar shares are obtainable elsewhere, but will act
to prevent the corporation from decreasing the number of units
of membership by "disowning" a member, even though such
shares are readily purchasable on the market. This distinction
is hardly tenable. Granting that in the latter case the legal -rem-
edy may be inadequate if it necessitates a succession of actions
at law by the shareholder to enforce his rights and powers, it may
be similarly inadequate in the first case if the corporation refuses
to recognize the other party as a shareholder after he has used
his money damages to purchase shares on the market. Moreover,
even though shares similar in class and number to those con-
tracted for can be readily purchased elsewhere, money damages
may not be adequate, especially if the contract relates to a large
block of shares, as the contemplated increase in the corporation's
capital will not result from a purchase of the shares on the mar-
ket.
One of the chief sources of confusion in this type of case
is the tendency to regard the shares which a corporation contracts
to create as "property" of the corporation. A contract by a cor-
poration to .create shares is not comparable to a contract to sell
coal, nor even to a contract by a shareholder to transfer his shares
to another. When the buyer of the coal or of the shares from
an existing shareholder receives the equivalent in kind of the
thing contracted for, the transaction is a fait accompli. But the
performance of a contract to create shares necessarily involves a
continuing relationship between the corporation and the other
party, the fulfillment of which may well require a degree of judi-
cial supervision. For these reasons, plus the difficulty of deter-
mining in many instances whether a contract to create shares
has or has not resulted in shareholdership, equity should take
jurisdiction of actions arising out of contracts to create shares,
where the corporation is materially in default, to the same extent
(i879) ; Davenport v. Piano Implement Co., 70 Ill. App. i6r (1897) ; Scherck
v. Montgomery, 8i Miss. 426, 33 So. 507 (igo0); Westminster Bank v. New
England Electrical Works, 73 N. H. 465, 62 Atl. 971 (Igo6) ; Feckheimer v.
National Exchange Bank, 79 Va. 8o (1884); BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note
37, § 155; I MACHENs, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 515, 934.
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as of actions to be "restored" to corporate membership. For those
who cherish the doctrine of mutuality, it might again be noted
that by the weight of authority the corporation is accorded an
action for the full contract price when the other party is in de-
fault, without regard to its ability to find another purchaser else-
where.' 0
Although the right of a shareholder with respect to the crea-
tion of additional shares by his corporation is usually described
by the term "pre-emptive right," this is a two-fold legal relation:
(I) if he be a voting shareholder, he has a right to that propor-
tion of the additional voting shares proposed to be created which
the number of voting shares then held by him bears to the total
number of voting shares then outstanding; and (2) he has a right
not to have the value of his interest with respect to dividend pay-
ments and capital distribution adversely affected by the creation
of additional shares at less than their reasonable sale value.0 1
Consequently, if the corporation has entered into a contract to
create shares the performance of which would violate either of
these rights of existing shareholders, equity will not grant specific
performance to the other party, although he may be entitled to
damages for breach of contract if, at the time of contracting, he
neither knew nor had reason to know that the rights of existing
shareholders would be violated by performance of the contract.
THE MEASURE OF THE OTHER PARTY'S RECOVERY UPON
BREACH BY THE CORPORATION
Where the circumstances entitle the other party to specific
performance, this remedy is cumulative and not exclusive. In
every case of breach by the corporation of its contract to create
shares as to the other party, he may elect either to "disaffirm"
the transaction and recover his "advance payments," or to "af-
firm" and recover damages.62 In other words, he can compel the
® See supra note 54.
See BUSINESS AssocIATioNs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst., Tentative No.
1, 1928) §§ 11-20; see also the writer's article, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights
(1929) 38 YALE L. J. 563.
"Watkins v. Record Photo. Abstract Co., 76 Ore. 421, 149 Pac. 478 (915);
DeLamar v. Fidelity Loan & Investment Co., 158 Ga. 361, 123 S. E. 116 (1924);
Mutual Loan Society, Inc. v. Stowe, 15 Ala. App. 293, 73 So. 202 (1916).
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corporation either: (i) to repay him any money, pay him the rea-
sonable value of any services, restore to him any property or its
equivalent in money and cancel any instrument that he may have
paid, rendered, conveyed, or given to the corporation on account
of the contract, with appropriate adjustment of interest or rental
value;63 or (2) to pay him the "value" of the shares contracted
for less any unpaid balance of the contract price, with appropri-
ate adjustment of interest. As has been heretofore noted, the
corporation may be in default through its refusal to tender to
the other party an appropriate share certificate or otherwise to
recognize him as a shareholder, although he became a share-
holder on the agreed date. An action for the recovery of "ad-
vance payments" will lie only if the other party is not a holder
of the shares contracted for at the time of the action; 64 the
theory behind this distinction apparently being that if the other
party automatically became a shareholder, his remedies against
the corporation for its wrongful conduct are those of any share-
holder who has been "disowned" by the corporation, and that
these remedies do not include recovery from the corporation of
that which he may have paid to it.
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If the other party elects to sue for damages the most diffi-
cult problem is to determine the "value" of the shares contracted
' Rumery v. Standard Seed Tester Co., 194 Iowa 325, 189 N. W. 667
(1922) ; Berner v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 268 S. W. 658 (Mo. 1925) ; Watkins
v. Record Photo. Abstract Co., supra note 62; see Swazey v. Choate Mfg. Co.,
48 N. H. 2oo, 202 (1868); DeLamar v. Fidelity Loan & Investment Co., supra
note 62, at 366, 123 S. E. at 118.
. Arnold v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. 424 (N. Y. 1857); see Mutual Loan
Society, Inc. v. Stowe, supra note 62, at 298, 73 So. at 205; Robey v. Hardy,
supra note 59, at 239, 224 Pac. at 8g2.
' This distinction may be traced to deceptive sales analogies, themselves of
doubtful validity. Moreover, owing to the frequent impossibility of categori-
cally determining whether the other party is or is not a shareholder, the diffi-
culties of applying the diftinction are extreme. In both instances the corporation
has failed to do an act which it was under a duty to the other party to perform.
The important consideration is the material or essential character of the corpo-
ration's breach of duty, rather than whether or not the other party was techni-
cally a shareholder at the time of the breach. If, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, including the institutional practices (or "trade customs") in-
volved, the right of the other party is of sufficient significance to justify a vari-
ety of sanctions, he should in both cases be accorded the secondary right, at his
election, to a return of his consideration; if not, he should in both cases be
denied this right.
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for. Some courts have gone so far as to use the par value of the
shares in estimating the other party's damages, regardless of mar-
ket value. 66 Other courts have adopted the market value at the
time the action was brought,67 and still others the market value
at the time of the corporation's breach.0 8 It may well be that
none of these methods of evaluating the other party's damages
is adequate and that the basis should be the highest market value
of shares similar to those contracted for between the time of the
breach and judgment, provided the other party made his election
to recover damages with reasonable promptitude after knowledge
of the breach.
The right of the other party to damages is contingent upon
his having demanded the shares contracted for;"0 and the mere
failure of the corporation to tender is insufficient in the absence
of such a demand.7 0 But acceptance by the other party of a late
tender of the shares contracted for does not wholly terminate his
right to damages, and he can still recover the excess, if any, of
the value of the shares on the agreed date over their value on the
date of their creation. 71 Furthermore, in the event of such late
"tender" and acceptance, the other party is entitled to dividends
declared subsequent to the contract date for the creation of the
shares.7 2  He has, however, no claim to dividends declared prior
to that date.73
'Wheeler v. Ocker & Ford Co., 162 Mich. 204, 127 N. W. 332 (191o); cf.
Moore v. Hudson River R. R., 12 Barb. 156 (N. Y. 1851); Barker v. Troy &
Rutland R. R., supra note 58.
' Barker v. Troy & Rutland R. R., supra note 58.
'New England Oil Refining Co. v. Wiltsie, 3 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. Ist,
1925) ; Boody v. Rutland & Burlington R. R., 24 Vt. 66o (1853) ; Katleman v.
Leon's, Inc., IiO Neb. 129, 193 N. W. 254 (1923) ; Mutual Loan Society, Inc. v.
Stowe, supra note 62; Coray v. Perry Irrigation Co., 5o Utah 70, 166 Pac. 672
(917).
'Weaver v. Consumers' Box Board & Paper Co., 246 Pa. 438, 92 Atd. 553
(914) ; Martin v. Fox & Wisconsin Improvement Co., 19 Wis. 552 (1865).
Moore v. Hudson River R. R., supra note 66.
Rock v. Gustaveson Oil Co., 61 Utah 399, 214 Pac. 3Ol (1923).
'Arapahoe Cattle & Land Co. v. Stevens, 13 Colo. 534, 22 Pac. 823 (1889);
Union Screw Co. v. American Screw Co., ii R. I. 569 (1877).
' Union Screw Co. v. American Screw Co., sn pra note 72.
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CONCLUSION
This article might properly include many other interesting
problems arising out of contracts to create shares than those
dealt with herein, were it not for the tyranny of time and space.
One of the most interesting of these omitted phases concerns the
effect upon the legal relations of the parties to the contract of cer-
tain corporate acts occurring between the date of contracting
and the time for the creation of the shares. For example, does
the right of the other party to shares survive against a new cor-
poration into which the contracting corporation was consolidated
during this interval? What, if any, amendments of the articles
of association during this interval will exonerate the other party
from performance of the contract? Will a change in the share
structure of the corporation or in the incidents of shares out-
standing affect the rights and duties of the contracting parties?
These and kindred problems, however, can be much more ade-
quately dealt with in a separate article.
Many of the controversies arising out of transactions for
the creation of shares are the result of a deplorable lack of pre-
cision either on the part of the contracting parties or of the
draftsman of the agreement. The chief object of this paper is
to point out some of the major difficulties fostered by this lack
of preciseness, and to emphasize the necessity in such transactions
of categorically stating when and under what circumstances the
other party is to become a shareholder, and of expressly stipu-
lating the legal relations of the parties with respect to the vari-
ous combinations of fact most likely to arise.
